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LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS AND RELIGION:
THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE ACTION
The problems of prayer and religion issues at the local school
board level have not been solved by the flood of publications which
followed Engel v. Vitale,' and School District of Abington v.
Schempp.2 In the former decision, the United States Supreme Court
held, in 1962, that the New York laws requiring or permitting use
of "The Regents' Prayer" were violative of the establishment clause
of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The Regents' prayer was non-denominational and had been com-
posed by or for the Regents of the State of New York. In the
Schempp case, the Court held that requirements in Pennsylvania for
daily Bible reading or recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the public
schools also were violations of the establishment clause. The deci-
sions were unpopular8 and apparently were widely misunderstood.
For example, suggestions that Thanksgiving or Christmas programs
and baccalaureate services were now illegal, that the National
Anthem could not be sung in public schools, or that the Pledge of
Allegiance must be banned because it contains the words "under
God," were widely circulated.4
School boards have been summoned into court because they
would not permit voluntary prayer at school,5 and in another case,
because they did permit such prayers.' Parents with opposing views
of the problem are demanding school board action at public meet-
ings.7 Such pressures pose difficult problems. What is the law under
which a local board now must handle complaints from parents
favoring or condemning practices which are tentatively characterized
1 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
3 Two months after the Engel decision, the Gallup Poll reported that 79% of
those questioned in a nationwide poll favored the continuation of religious observances
in the public schools. Dissatisfaction and alarm publicly expressed was commented
upon in Time, Aug. 24, 1962, p. 40. By June 1964, 115 Congressmen had introduced
a total of 154 proposed constitutional amendments to overcome the effects of the
Court's rulings in the prayer and Bible reading cases. The proposed amendments
are set forth in Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., ser. 9, pt. 1, at 1-59 (1964).
4 U.S. News and World Report, July 9, 1962, p. 44; Newsweek, July 9, 1962,
p. 44; U.S. News and World Report, July 1, 1963, p. 41.
5 Stein v. Oshinsky, 224 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 348 F.2d 999
(2d Cir. 1965).
6 Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
7 For example, see San Jose Mercury, March 16, 1965, p. 15, Col. 6-8 (4 star
ed.), reporting complaints of parents to the Scotts Valley (California) Union School
District governing board alleging that school prayer practices permitted were illegal.
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"religious"? This is a vital political and legal question, but one which
has been difficult to answer in any meaningful way, since we are only
starting to refine this radical change in constitutional interpretation.
The true meaning and the limits on the changes required are just
now emerging from the decisions of the courts as they consider issues
raised in new controversies in the light of the Engel and Schempp
decisions.
WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED
The Engel decision, for all the furor it created, was a narrow
one which altered the definition of the constitutional phrase "es-
tablishment of religion," and pointed out that the mere enactment of
a state law respecting establishment of religion is violative of the
establishment clause of the first amendment. The Schempp decision
a year later held that daily Bible reading or recitation of the Lord's
Prayer is a religious activity, and that the enactment of any state
law or rule requiring or authorizing such activity is violative of the
establishment clause. The Court drew attention to the rigidity of
the establishment clause: " 'But, the First Amendment, in its final
form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a
church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion.' "'
The minimum meaning, then, of the majority opinions9 of
Engel and Schempp taken together appears to be that neither daily
prayer nor Bible reading may be required or authorized by a state
as part of the school program without violating the establishment
clause of the Constitution. The prohibition against rule making
concerning activities which constitute "establishment" appears to
be absolute. No degrees of rule making are suggested. The holding
in Schempp indicated that the prohibition of the first amendment
that no law respecting an establishment of religion shall be made is
intended to include even a local school board regulation. Therefore it
appears that any leeway for rule making can only involve the inter-
pretation given to the phrase "establishment of religion."
Maximum Compliance-Liberal Interpretation
Certainly a school board may act as if the Schempp doctrine
prohibits making rules about anything remotely touching upon the
subject of religion, if it chooses to do so. This could be done even
8 374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963).
9 Only the two majority opinions are considered binding, since the various
minority opinions can not be accommodated in any one coherent theory. In the
author's opinion, there is no rational basis for accepting one of the minority opinions
over others which disagree.
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without the Schempp doctrine, for the powers given to a local school
board to administer the educational program largely discretionary
in nature. It is clear that the courts will not require local officials to
undertake Thanksgiving, Christmas, baccalaureate, or similar pro-
grams against their wishes and judgment. Such an attempted inter-
ference by a court would meet the fate of the injunction issued in
Stein v. Oshinsky,'° where the Second Circuit Court said:
[W]e shall assume, arguendo, in plaintiff's favor that the Establish-
ment Clause would not prohibit New York from permitting in its
public schools prayers such as those here at issue. Nevertheless New
York is not bound to allow them unless the Free Exercise Clause or
the guarantee of Freedom of Speech of the First Amendment compels.
Neither provision requires a state to permit persons to engage in
public prayer in state owned facilities wherever and whenever they
desire."
But such assurances of immunity from court action, if a school
board prohibits every sort of activity which might remotely touch a
religious theme, are of no help. The board probably had such power
before the Engel and Schempp decisions were made. Moreover, few
boards or local communities will wish to conduct a "witch hunt"
against all religious activities. Instead, boards are seeking to know
exactly what they are now legally prevented from authorizing, so the
full scope of retained discretion can be understood and applied as
policy may direct.
Minimum Compliance-Strict Interpretation
It seems clear that no subdivisions, agencies, or employees of
the state will be privileged to do the very thing that the state is pro-
hibited from doing, that is to read the Bible or recite a prayer each
day as part of the school program. It cannot be argued successfully
that the local board, or even local school employees are not "the
state" in this context. Only the most tenuous connection of a
defendant to the state is necessary to show "state action."' 2 It must
be assumed that federal courts will enforce the very prohibition
which the Supreme Court has established. But it is not necessary
to assume that there will be an extension of the interpretation of
the meaning of the phrase "establishment of religion." Perhaps daily
prayers at school are not an "establishment of religion" prohibited
by the first amendment if state employees do not supervise the
activity and attendance is voluntary. Perhaps reading the Bible
as part of a Thanksgiving, Christmas or Hanukkah program may
10 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965).
11 Id. at 1001.
12 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-87 (1961).
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not be "establishment of religion" even if done under the instruc-
tions of a state employee. Perhaps religious baccalaureate services
may not be "establishment of religion" even though planned as
school activities prior to actual graduation. Perhaps even the most
religious verses of the National Anthem may be sung or recited
as often as school authorities may require. Perhaps other hymns
may be used in school as appropriate. These possibilities seem to fit
into a category of activities outside the strict interpretation of the
prohibitions laid down in the Schempp doctrine.
A narrow interpretation of the meaning of the decisions hasjudicial support. United States Circuit Court Judge Irving R. Kauf-
man has said:
The decisions of the Court in the School Prayer and Bible-Reading
cases must be read with an eye toward the very limited character of
their holdings .... A reading of not only the majority opinion but
also of the concurring opinions reveals the narrowly constricted
character of the Court's holding as well at its reiteration of the perva-
siveness of the role of religion in our society.18
Moreover, it seems reasonable, on the doctrine of de minimis,
that there will be no new extensions of specific prohibitions by the
Supreme Court in the religion-in-schools matter in the near future.
Remaining related issues do not nearly approach the importance of
those already decided. In this connection, it must be appreciated that
prior to the Engel decision, thirty-seven of the states required or
permitted Bible reading in school each day. 4 The New York statute
alone affected approximately one tenth of all the school children in
the United States. More than half of all public school children were
subject to some sort of state authorized religious program prior to
these decisions. Whatever local difficulties may arise with or in one
school district in the future, the national significance underlying
these decisions will be missing.
The Supreme Court has decided only one prayer and Bible
reading case since Schempp. The State of Florida had contended, in
Chamberlin v. Board of Public Instruction,5 that Schempp was not
applicable because the Florida Legislature had declared that the
purpose of the Bible reading statute was educational, not religious.
The reversal was handled by the Supreme Court in a manner which
did not broaden the definition of "establishment of religion." The
opportunity to rule directly on the matter of religious baccalaureate
13 Excerpts from Proceedings of the Annual Judicial Conference of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit, 34 F.R.D. 29, 40 (1963).
14 BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLs 273 (1963).
15 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
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services under state requirement or authorization was avoided by
dismissing that issue. One Justice dissented. 6 Nor has the Court
extended the concept of "establishment of religion" to other fringe
areas, such as use of the words "In God We Trust" on our coins, or
"under God" in our Pledge of Allegiance. It is unnecessary to sup-
pose that the Court would broaden the definition of "establishment
of religion" if a new case were presented to it.
One principle which was not established in Engel and Schempp;
despite extensive comment by Justice Douglas, was the idea that an
accommodation of religion by the state is violative of the Constitu-
tion. The proposal of Justice Douglas that even minor financial
accommodation of any religious activity should be held unconstitu-
tional was not joined by any other Justice. His invitation to overrule
Everson v. Board of Education17 was not accepted. Everson upholds
the right of a state to pay bus fares for children attending state
schools or church schools.' It remains good law that mere accommo-
dation of a religious activity is not unconstitutional, even though it
may involve some state expense.
SUBSEQUENT LOWER COURT DECISIONS
A New Jersey Bible reading statute was declared unconstitu-
tional by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Sills v. Board of Edu-
cation.' Federal district courts invalidated the state Bible reading
statutes in Delaware2" and in Idaho.2 The Florida, New Jersey,
Delaware, and Idaho decisions so far mentioned were on point with
Schempp. But none of the other religion in school cases reported
since Schempp are exactly on point, and the decisions in these cases
indicate that the Schempp doctrine is being strictly limited in ap-
plication to exactly parallel fact situations.
Other Issues in the Florida Case
In Chamberlin v. Board of Public Instruction22 the state statute
was challenged on five issues: Bible reading, recitation of the Lord's
16 Reversal on the issues of Bible reading and prayer was unamimous. The
issue of religious baccalaureate services was dismissed without opinion, Justice
Stewart dissenting. The remaining two issues, conducting a religious census among
pupils and requiring religious tests for teachers, were dismissed without opinion,
Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Black dissenting. The majority dismissal of the
issues not related to prayer or Bible reading was "for want of properly presented
federal questions."
17 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18 Id. at 17-18.
19 42 N.J. 351, 200 A.2d 615 (1964).
20 Johns v. Allen, 231 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1964).
21 Adams v. Engelking, 232 F. Supp. 666 (D. Idaho 1964).
22 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
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Prayer, religious baccalaureate services, religious census of students,
and religious tests for qualification of teachers. On the first appeal to
the United States Supreme Court28 the decision of the Florida court
affirming the validity of the state statute was vacated. Upon recon-
sideration, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous deci-
sion.24 On second appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Florida court as to Bible reading and prayer, but dis-
missed as to the other issues.25 The Florida court then upheld the
Florida statute on the three issues not reversed by the Supreme
Court.2 These actions by the Florida court constitute strict inter-
pretation of the Schempp decision. The definition of "establishment
of religion" was not broadened.
Two New York Cases
In Stein v. Oshinsky,2" the federal district court issued an in-junction requiring local school officials to permit voluntary daily
prayers in the Whitestone, N.Y. schools. The Second Circuit Court
reversed, but the court avoided any extension of the establishment
clause prohibition by deciding the case on the free exercise and
freedom of speech clauses. This is an exercise of restraint, if not
strict interpretation.
A New York court held, in Lawrence v. Buchmueller," that
a resolution of a local school board which permitted erection of a
creche on school property during a portion of the Christmas vacation
period did not amount to "establishment of religion." The Engel and
Schempp cases were cited in the opinion, but quite clearly the thrust
of Justice Douglas' concurring opinions in those cases was not
accepted as a limitation. Again, no extension of the Schempp doctrine
occurred.
The Arizona Case
Members of the Jehovah's Witness religious sect sought an
injunction in Sheldon v. Fannin29 to ban the use of the National
Anthem in public schools. The court said:
The singing of the National Anthem is not a religious but a patriotic
ceremony, intended to inspire devotion to and love of country ....
The Star Spangled Banner may be freely sung in the public schools,
23 374 U.S. 487 (1963).
24 160 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1964).
25 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
20 171 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1965).
27 224 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965).
28 40 Misc. 2d 300, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
29 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).
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without fear of having the ceremony characterized as an "establish-
ment of religion."
30
Although the singing of this hymn was not banned under the
establishment clause, the children who object to singing it for
religious reasons are to be permitted to sit quietly while other chil-
dren stand and sing. Requiring participation would have involved
coercion in violation of the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment of the Constitution.
The Michigan Case
A clear example of a disinclination to extend the Schempp doc-
trine beyond exactly parallel fact situations is shown in Reed v. Van
Hoven.3 In this case the federal district court is co-operating with
pro-prayer, anti-prayer, and school official groups to work out a
means, if possible, of providing an opportunity for voluntary prayers
at school and within the limitations of the first amendment. Groups
of children are meeting voluntarily before or after school in space
provided by the school, but without a school employee leading the
group. The court retains jurisdiction of the case to consider and
adjust future difficulties. The solutions being attempted appear to be
based upon a strict, narrow interpretation of the Schempp decision.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The scope of the Supreme Court's decisions in the prayer and
Bible reading cases was very narrow. Under this new doctrine, daily
prayer or Bible reading at school, as part of the school program, is
prohibited as an "establishment of religion." It does not necessarily
follow that occasional prayer or Bible reading by school personnel,
or regular prayer or Bible reading not under the direction of school
personnel, are "establishment." Neither federal nor state courts have
taken advantage of opportunities which have been presented to
broaden the interpretation of the term "establishment of religion"
beyond the narrow limits indicated.
Arrangements to accommodate parents and school children who
wish to utilize school premises for voluntary religious activities have
been permitted by both federal and state courts. A state law specifi-
cally authorizing religious baccalaureate services has been upheld
by the Florida Supreme Court, and review of the issue was dismissed
on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, one Justice dis-
senting.
80 Id. at 774.
81 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
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Children who object to participating in particular school activi-
ties for religious reasons must be permitted to withdraw, however,
to avoid coercion in violation of the free exercise clause of the first
amendment of the Constitution.
A narrow interpretation of the prayer prohibition is indicated,
which leaves the local school board wide discretion in religion-
related matters. And if the school board uses its discretionary power
to refuse an accommodation of religion, the decision is a political one,
probably not subject to court review.
Philips B. Patton
